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1 Introduction
Despite the strengthening of the world trading system through the successful conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, there is still some concern that the formation of preferential
trade agreements may result in the fragmentation of the world economy.1 The risk
is that “countries that join trading blocs will be more protectionist towards countries
outside the blocs than they were before, so that the world as a whole will be hurt more
than helped by moves that at …rst seem to be liberalizing in intent.” (Krugman, 1991,
p. 9).
This concern is supported by studies of trade bloc formation focused on perfectly
competitive markets, which …nd that the creation of customs union (CUs), while ben-
e…cial to the member countries, can be harmful to non-member countries and may
reduce the welfare of the world as a whole.2
In this paper, we want to examine the process of trade bloc formation in the context
of imperfectly competitive markets. For this purpose, we employ a simple three-country
model of intra-industry trade, in which governments can alter the strategic interaction
between oligopolistic …rms through the use of import tari¤s and export subsidies. The
subsidization of …rms engaged in international rivalry is common practice in most
industrialized countries3, but cannot be explained by traditional trade theories: while
1According to Fratzsher (1996), 94% of world trade is conducted within or between the European
Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association for South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the period 1948-1994, GATT contracting parties noti…ed 118 preferential
trade agreements relating to trade in goods, of which 38 in the …ve years ending in 1994. Since the
completion of the Uruguay Round, 80 additional PTAs covering trade in goods and services have
been noti…ed. See Whalley and Hamilton (1996) and Sampson (1996) for more information about the
recent increase in the number of preferential trade agreements.
2For example, Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Kose and Riezman (1999) construct a pure ex-
change general equilibrium model with three countries and three goods, in which trade patterns are
determined by comparative advantage considerations. Using simulation techniques to compare opti-
mal tari¤s and welfare gains in alternative agreement structures, they show that for certain endowment
distributions CUs can pose a threat to the multilateral trading system, since, due to the improve-
ment in their terms of trade, member countries can obtain larger welfare gains than at the free trade
equilibrium.
3Since direct payments by the government to exporters are prohibited by GATT/WTO rules,
countries often use indirect forms of support. Examples of covert export subsidies are: currency
retention schemes which involve a bonus on exports; provision of goods or services for use in the
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import tari¤s can improve a country’s terms of trade, export subsidies do not appear
to make much sense, since they improve the terms of trade of the importing country.
The literature on strategic trade policy4, on the other hand, has shown that imperfect
competition can create new motives for the use of import tari¤s and export subsidies:
when domestic and foreign …rms compete in the domestic market, Brander and Spencer
(1984a,b) have shown that a tari¤ can be used to shift rents from foreign …rms to the
domestic …rms and treasury; when domestic and foreign …rms compete in a third
country, Brander and Spencer (1985) have demonstrated that export subsidies can
increase welfare by shifting pro…ts from foreign to domestic …rms.5
We describe international trade relations as a three-stage process. In the …rst stage,
countries decide whether or not to form cooperative trade agreements. These can take
three forms: ‘pure’ customs unions (CUs), in which member countries eliminate tari¤s
among themselves and set a common external tari¤ to maximize their joint welfare6;
agreements to coordinate the use of export subsidies only; and ‘impure’ CUs, involving
the coordinated use of both policy instruments.7 In the second stage, tari¤s and
subsidies are selected—cooperatively among countries participating in an agreement
and non-cooperatively between countries belonging to separate agreements. In the last
stage, …rms compete in quantities.
There is a presumption that, when they are combined, export subsidies and import
tari¤s will ‘neutralize’ each other. This presumption is misleading in our setup, since
the optimal response to a foreign export subsidy is never a fully countervailing tari¤.
A similar result is obtained, in a two-country context, by Dixit (1984, 1988) and Collie
production of exported goods on terms more favourable than those for the production of goods for
domestic consumption; export-related exemption, remission or deferral of direct taxes and social
welfare charges; excess exemption, remission, or deferral of indirect taxes or import duties; and export
credits extended at rates below the government’s cost of funds. See Ray (1995) for a discussion.
4See Brander (1995) for an extensive review of this literature.
5The pro…t-capture motive of trade intervention is most clearly seen when domestic and foreign
…rms are competing in a third country, since the home consumer surplus is not at issue.
6An example of a pure CU is provided by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
7The European Union can be considered an example of an ‘impure’ CU: its state aid policy restricts
the capacity of national governments to support their …rms and delegates to the Commission the task
of ensuring that all subsidies granted within the EU are compatible with the single market objectives
(see Cini and McGowan, 1998).
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(1991).8
We analyze the welfare implications of alternative trade arrangements. Then, using
the concept of Stable Agreement Structure developed in Conconi and Perroni (2000),
we examine the sustainability of the Joint Global Agreement—entailing international
cooperation on both policy variables. We …nd that, if the traded goods are homoge-
neous, ‘impure’ CUs are stumbling blocs against the attainment of multilateral trade
cooperation. If instead products are nationally di¤erentiated, trade bloc formation
might or might not pose a threat to multilateral cooperation, depending on the degree
of industry concentration and the extent of product di¤erentiation.
We show that the introduction of an international ban on export subsidies could
make multilateral trade cooperation sustainable when it would not be otherwise. There-
fore our analysis provides a rationale for recent strengthening of GATT/WTO rules
against export subsidies (see Laird, 1999).9
There has been little attempt to look at trade bloc formation in models of strategic
trade policy. Sinclair and Vines (1994) have extended Brander and Spencer (1984a)’s
tari¤ model to consider the impact of the creation of CUs and free trade areas (FTAs)
on the Nash equilibrium tari¤s. However, they have not considered the welfare im-
plications of trade bloc formation. In an in…nitely repeated version of Brander and
Spencer (1985)’s export subsidy game, Collie (1993) has shown that free trade can
be sustained by the threat of retaliation with the Nash equilibrium export subsidies,
provided that countries are similar and the discount factor is su¢ciently high. Collie
(1997) has employed a multi-country version of this model to study the e¤ects of trade
bloc enlargement. Di¤erently from our analysis, all these studies look at the e¤ects of
exogenous trade bloc formation, without considering countries’ agreement choices.
Our analysis is close in spirit to Yi (1996), who employs a multi-country extension of
Brander and Spencer (1984a)’s tari¤ model to describe endogenous trade bloc formation
under imperfect competition. He addresses the issue of the sustainability of global free
8Dixit (1984, 1988) and Collie (1991) describe the following three-stage game: in the …rst stage,
the foreign country sets its export subsidy; in the second stage, the domestic country chooses optimal
tari¤s; …nally, domestic and foreign …rms engage in Cournot competition. Both studies …nd that the
optimal retaliation against a foreign export subsidy is a partially countervailing tari¤.
9An alternative rationale is suggested by Bagwell and Staiger (1994). In their model, export sub-
sidies are used to coordinate the entry decision of …rms. They show that, when subsdidy coordination
does more to prevent entry than to promote entry, the world as a whole can be better o¤ when export
subsidies are banned.
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trade under alternative rules of CU formation.10 The main di¤erence with our analysis
is that Yi (1996) assumes that import tari¤s are the only available instrument, so that
‘pure’ CUs are the only potential threat to the global trading system. This allows him
to reach a more optimistic conclusion about the sustainability of multilateral trade
cooperation in the case of three ex-ante symmetric countries.
A general results emerging from our analysis is that modelling trade negotiations as
being on tari¤s only can be misleading, i.e. might result in drawing incorrect conclusions
about the negotiation outcomes.
Various studies have examined how international tari¤ negotiations might be af-
fected by the existence of alternative policy instruments. For example, Coopeland
(1990) has analyzed the general case of bilateral tari¤ negotiations when there exist
non-negotiable domestic policy instruments. Gatsios and Karp (1992) have looked at
the imperfect harmonization of trade and industrial policies and note the possibility
of welfare reducing preferential trade agreements when members coordinate only the
use of tari¤s. A similar result is obtained by Richardson (1999), who shows that the
uncoordinated use of domestic taxes/subsidies can render a ‘pure’ CU unattractive.
More recently, Richardson (1999), focusing on the interaction between trade and com-
petition policies, …nds that the formation of a CU improves members’ welfare only if
it goes beyond mere trade coordination. However, none of these studies examines the
endogenous formation of trade blocs and the issue of the sustainability of multilateral
trade cooperation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple three-country
model of intra-industry trade. In Section 3, we look at the welfare implications of
alternative trade arrangements. In Section 4, we examine the stability of such arrange-
ments. Section 5 considers the e¤ects of the introduction of an international ban on
export subsidies. Finally, section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante
10Yi (1996) …nds that CUs are stepping stones towards global free trade if membership of a trade
agreement is open to all players, but they might be stumbling blocs towards free trade if the formation
of a trade bloc requires the agreement of all potential members and the number of negotiating countries
exceeds a critical value. In the case of three countries, he …nds that global free trade is always
sustainable.
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symmetric countries. The speci…cation of production draws on the reciprocal-markets
trade model …rst proposed by Brander (1981) and elaborated by Brander and Krugman
(1983) and Dixit (1984).
Each country i 2 I ´ f1; 2; 3g is endowed with an amount ¹Mi of a numeraire good,
which is transferred across countries to settle the balance of trade. Let n be the number
of …rms located in each market.11 We assume that all …rms in a particular country
produce an identical product at constant marginal cost c, but allow national product
di¤erentiation. Let qik be sales in country k (destination) by a …rm located in country
i (origin), and Qk =
P
qik be total sales in country k.
A crucial assumption of the reciprocal-markets model is that markets are segmented,
in the sense that …rms make separate strategic decisions concerning di¤erent markets,
rather than selling their output in a uni…ed or integrated world market and relying on
arbitrage to distribute it to di¤erent locations.12 This assumption is appropriate for
sectors of the economy in which …rms have the ability to price discriminate between
countries, thus maintaining a dominant position in their domestic markets.13
Preferences of a representative consumer in country k can be described by the
following quasilinear utility function
uk(Mk; Qk; µ) ´Mk + vk ´Mk + aQk ¡ b
Ã
µ
2
Q2k ¡ 1 ¡ µ2
X
k
q2ik
!
; k 2 I; (1)
whereMk is the consumption of the numeraire good14, qik is country k’s consumption of
a good produced in country i, and Qk =
P
i qik is k’s total consumption. The product
di¤erentiation parameter µ ranges from 0 (independent goods) to 1 (homogeneous
11We assume that the number of …rms in each country is …xed. This can be regarded as a short-
run situation or as a situation in which there are legal or technical entry barriers. See Brander
and Krugman (1983) and Markusen and Venables (1988) for an analysis of the implications of trade
liberalization with free entry.
12Alternatively, one could assume that oligopolistic …rms compete in an integrated market (see, for
example, Horstmann and Markusen, 1986) or make a two stage decision, setting …rst their world-wide
capacity, and then market speci…c quantities or prices (Venables, 1990).
13For example, there is some evidence of markets segmentation in the European car market (see
Flam and Nordstrom, 1994) and in the market for computer chips (see Baldwin and Krugman, 1988).
14We assume that ¹Mi is large enough to guarantee a positive consumption of the numeraire good.
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goods). Country k’s inverse demand for country i’s good is given by
Pik = a¡ b [(1 ¡ µ)qik ¡ µQk] : (2)
Governments can alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic …rms through the
use of import tari¤s and export subsidies. Let tik denote country k’s tari¤s on imports
from country i and ski be its export subsidy (for home …rms’ exports to country i).
The sequential structure of the model consists of three stages. In the …rst stage,
countries decide whether to select policies unilaterally or form cooperative trade agree-
ments.15 Countries may choose to coordinate the use of tari¤s only. In this case, we
assume that they form ‘pure’ customs unions (CU), eliminating tari¤s among them-
selves16 and selecting a common external tari¤ so as to maximize their joint welfare. 17
Alternatively, countries may decide to form agreements to cooperatively select export
subsidies. A third option is to form ‘impure’ CUs, involving the coordinated use of
both tari¤s and subsidies. We rule out international transfers.18
In the second stage, tari¤s and subsidies are selected— cooperatively among coun-
tries participating in an agreement and non-cooperatively between countries belonging
to separate agreements. In the …nal stage, …rms compete by choosing quantities in
each market. As usual, we start by analyzing the last stage of the game, and solve for
the equilibrium for the full game by backward induction.
15We assume that countries can credibly commit to trade cooperation and that international trade
agreements are binding. Our analysis thus di¤ers from the strand of the literature which argues against
the legitimacy of assuming binding commitments in international trade negotiations (e.g. Bagwell and
Staiger, 1997).
16One might also consider the more general case in which the CUs are characterized by non-zero
tari¤s between members. One institutional justi…cation for the internal zero-tari¤ assumption is the
fact that the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) permits the formation of preferential
trade agreements provided that “the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are elimi-
nated on substantially all trade between the constituents territories in products originating in such
territories” (Article XXIV).
17As underlined by Gatsios and Karp (1995) and Park (2000), trade negotiations will generally
involve a con‡ict between countries of di¤erent sizes. However, by focusing on symmetric countries,
we remove the possibility of the emergence of this con‡ict.
18While it may be that transfers are important, to analyze them one has to …rst know what hap-
pens in their absence. The role of side-payments in international trade negotiations is analyzed by
Kowalczyk (1994).
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In the absence of transport costs19, the e¤ective cost of supplying the traded good
to country k for the …rm located in country i is c+ tik¡ sik and its pro…ts are given by
¼ik = (Pik + sik ¡ c¡ tik)qik; (3)
with associated …rst-order condition20
@¼ik
@qik
= a¡ c¡ b(1 + n)qik ¡ bnµ
X
j 6=i
qjk + sik ¡ tik = 0: (4)
Equation (4) represents the reaction functions (in implicit form) for the …rms supplying
market k. It shows the best-reply output of a …rm, given whatever level of output is
produced by the other …rms. Notice that the pro…t function satis…es Hahn (1962)’s
condition for stability of a Cournot equilibrium:
d¼ik
dqjk
< 0; 8i 6= j;
that is, each …rm’s marginal revenue in one market declines as the output of any other
…rm rises.21 Solving (4) for all k 2 I, we obtain domestic and foreign sales in country
k at the Cournot equilibrium:
qkk( ~tik; ~sik) =
®(1 + n¡ µn) + µn(Pi6=k tik ¡ Pi6=k sik)
±
; (5)
qik( ~tik; ~sik) =
®(1 + n¡ µn) + (1 + n+ µn) (sik ¡ tik) + µntjk
±
; (6)
where ® = a ¡ c is a measure of market size and is assumed to be positive (since
otherwise a …rm will never produce any output), ± = b(1 + n¡ µn)(1 + n+ 2µn) > 0,
and ~tik and ~sik are the vectors of tari¤s and subsidies for all …rms selling in country k.
19Di¤erently from Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), we assume that …rms do
not incur any transport costs in supplying foreign markets. However, such costs are assumed to be
prohibitive for any third-party arbitragers.
20With linear demand, since pro…ts functions are concave, the second-order conditions for pro…t-
maximization are satis…ed and there exist a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
21Expression (2) also implies that the strategic variables qik and qjk are strategic substitutes as
de…ned by Bulow et al. (1985).
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Notice that the quantities produced for market k do not depend on variables in
markets other than k. As noted by Brander (1981), this separability property depends
crucially on the assumption of constant marginal costs.22
Negative solutions to equations (5)-(6) are possible but not meaningful, so the
reaction functions are truncated at zero. We rule out corner solutions, assuming that
in equilibrium each …rm produces a strictly positive outcome. Since all …rms sell both
at home and abroad, market equilibrium involves intra-industry trade, even when …rms
located in di¤erent countries sell homogeneous products (cross-hauling).
Equations (5)-(6) imply the following comparative statics e¤ects:
dqik
dsik
=
1 + n¡ µn
±
> 0; (7)
dqkk
dsik
=
dqjk
dsik
= ¡µn
±
< 0; (8)
dqik
dtik
= ¡1 + n+ µn
±
< 0; (9)
dqkk
dtik
=
dqjk
dtik
=
µn
±
> 0; (10)
From (7) and (8) it follows that, when a country increases its subsidy for exports to
a given market, its sales in that market increase, while the sales of all other countries
fall. Equations (9) and (10) imply that, when a country increases its tari¤ on imports
from a given country, imports from that county fall, while imports from other countries
and its own domestic sales increase.
Given the quasilinearity of the utility function, if pro…ts and tax revenues are re-
bated back uniformly to all consumers, country k’s welfare can be written as the sum
of domestic consumer surplus (CS), government revenues (GR), and total pro…ts of
domestic …rms in all markets (¦). Using (4), we can express a …rm’s domestic and
foreign pro…ts as ¼kk = bq2kk( ~tik; ~sik) and ¼ki = bq2ki( ~tki; ~ski), respectively. Welfare can
thus be written as
Wk( ~tik; ~sik; ~tki; ~ski) ´ CSk +GRk +¦k
22If marginal costs depended on production levels, market separability would be lost and one could
not rule out the kind of strategies considered by Krugman (1984), where an advantage given to a …rm
in one market spills over into a further advantage in another market.
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´ vk( ~tik; ~sik) ¡
X
k
nqik( ~tik; ~sik)pik( ~tik; ~sik) +
n
0@X
i 6=k
tikqik( ~tik; ~sik) ¡
X
k
skiqki( ~tki; ~ski)
1A +
n
0@bq2kk( ~tik; ~sik) + X
i6=k
bq2ki( ~tki; ~ski)
1A : (11)
In the model described above, there are two sorts of gains from trade: the pro-
competitive gains generated by the reduced market power of the domestic industry,
and the increase in the variety of goods available to consumers. It is important to
notice that, due to the quasilinearity of the utility function and to the assumption of
market segmentation, there are no terms of trade e¤ects.23
3 Agreement Structures and Welfare
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of alternative trade arrangements.
Since the countries are symmetric, we can limit our analysis to the following nine
agreement structures:24
1. Joint Global Agreement (JGA):
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2; s3gg;
2. No agreement on either issue (Nash Equilibrium):
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg;
3. Global tari¤ agreement, no agreement on subsidies:
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg;
4. Global agreement on subsidies, no tari¤ agreement:
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg;
5. Partial agreement on subsidies, no tari¤ agreement:
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg;
23As remarked by Yi (1996), terms of trade e¤ects are placed solely on the numeraire good.
24Notice that we exclude the scenario in which one country coordinates the use of export sub-
sidies with one partner and the use of export subsidies with another, i.e. agreement structure
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2; s3gg and its mirror images.
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6. Partial tari¤ agreement, no agreement on subsidies (‘pure’ CU):
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg;
7. Partial overlapping agreements on tari¤s and subsidies (‘impure’ CU):
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg;
8. Global tari¤ agreement and partial agreement on subsidies:
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg;
9. Global agreement on subsidies and partial tari¤ agreement:
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, in the rest of our analysis we set
® = b = 1. We …rst consider the case in which the traded goods are homogeneous
(µ = 1), and then examine the case in which …rms produce nationally di¤erentiated
goods (µ < 1).
3.1 The Case of Homogeneous Goods
The optimal policies and equilibrium welfare functions for the case of homogeneous
goods can be found in the Appendix. Table 1 reports the welfare gains obtained in
di¤erent agreement structures, under alternative assumptions about the number of
…rms located in each market.
As expected, welfare gains increase with the number of …rms located in each market.
This is due to pro-competitive e¤ects associated with the decrease in industry concen-
tration. Notice that, as n increases, the di¤erence between the welfare gains obtained
in di¤erent structures falls. The intuition behind this result is that, as markets become
more competitive, the pro…t-shifting incentives for the use of import tari¤s and export
subsidies tend to disappear.25
The analysis of Table 1 also reveals that agreement structures 1, 4 and 9 and
agreement structures 5 and 7 yield the same welfare gains. This implies that tari¤
coordination is irrelevant for countries that are already coordinating the use of export
subsidies.
Comparing the welfare gains obtained under alternative agreement structures, we
obtain the following result:
25This can also be seen from Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix. The analytical results presented in
the Appendix show that, as n ! 1, optimal tari¤s and subsidies in all agreement structures tend to
zero.
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Table 1: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Homogeneous Goods)
(µ = 1)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
n = 1 n = 5 n = 8
1)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5
2)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:4339 Wk = 0:4902 Wk = 0:4952
3)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:4922 Wk = 0:4994 Wk = 0:4997
4)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5
5)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:51 W1;2 = 0:5007 W1;2 = 0:5003
W3 = 0:4 W3 = 0:4871 W3 = 0:4941
6)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:4873 W1;2 = 0:4989 W1;2 = 0:4995
W3 = 0:4229 W3 = 0:4891 W3 = 0:4948
7)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:51 W1;2 = 0:5007 W1;2 = 0:5003
W3 = 0:4 W3 = 0:4871 W3 = 0:4941
8)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:5625 W1;2 = 0:5208 W1;2 = 0:5139
W3 = 0:3437 W3 = 0:4549 W3 = 0:4707
9)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5 Wk = 0:5
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Lemma 1 In the case of homogeneous goods, the welfare ranking is always as follows:
W 81;2 > W
5;7
1;2 > W
1;4;9
k > W 3k > W 61;2 > W 2k > W 63 > W
5;7
3 > W 83 .
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Therefore, relative to the Nash Equilibrium, all preferential trade agreements will
always increase the welfare of the member countries and decrease the welfare of the
non-member country.
Compared to the Joint Global Agreement, two countries will always loose by coor-
dinating tari¤s only (structure 6) and gain by coordinating the use of export subsidies
(structures 5 and 7 and 8). The reason behind this result is that, by forming a prefer-
ential trade agreement on subsidies, two countries are able to shift rents from the …rms
located in the non-member country to their domestic …rms and treasury.26
3.2 The Case of Heterogeneous Goods
We now turn our attention to the case of di¤erentiated goods. Tables 2 and 3 report the
welfare gains obtained in the nine agreement structures, under di¤erent assumptions
about the degree of product di¤erentiation and the number of …rms located in each
country.27
From Tables 2 and 3, we can see that welfare gains increase with the degree of
product di¤erentiation (i.e. decrease with µ). The reason behind this result is that,
since individuals enjoy variety, an increase in product di¤erentiation implies an increase
in consumer surplus.
By comparing the welfare gains obtained in the nine agreement structures, we
obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 In the case of heterogeneous goods, the welfare ranking of alternative agree-
ment structures depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation and on the number of
…rms located in each market.
26This can be seen by comparing the equilibrium policies reported in the Appendix. It is easy to
verify that, relative to the JGA, in structures 5, 7 and 8, countries 1 and 2 always choose to subsidize
less their exports to country 3 and to subsidize more their exports to each other’s markets.
27The analytical expressions for the equilibrium policies and welfare functions used to derive the
results in Tables 2 and 3 can be obtained upon request.
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Table 2: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods)
(n = 1)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
µ = 2=10 µ = 1=2 µ = 8=10
1)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:0088 Wk = 0:7222 Wk = 0:5655
2)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:7551 Wk = 0:5907 Wk = 0:4856
3)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:8907 Wk = 0:6817 Wk = 0:5526
4)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:0088 Wk = 0:7222 Wk = 0:5655
5)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:9101 W1;2 = 0:6903 W1;2 = 0:5574
W3 = 0:0:6957 W3 = 0:5203 W3 = 0:4329
6)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:8306 W1;2 = 0:6491 W1;2 = 0:5356
W3 = 0:7334 W3 = 0:5650 W3 = 0:4672
7)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:9101 W1;2 = 0:6903 W1;2 = 0:5574
W3 = 0:6957 W3 = 0:5203 W3 = 0:4329
8)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:9788 W1;2 = 0:7426 W1;2 = 0:6068
W3 = 0:7987 W3 = 0:5500 W3 = 0:4072
9)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:088 Wk = 0:7222 Wk = 0:5655
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Table 3: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods)
(n = 8)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
µ = 2=10 µ = 1=2 µ = 8=10
1)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:0683 Wk = 0:7485 Wk = 0:5760
2)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:9320 Wk = 0:6973 Wk = 0:5585
3)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg Wk = 0:9547 Wk = 0:7140 Wk = 0:5705
4)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:0683 Wk = 0:7485 Wk = 0:5760
5)
fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 1:0242 W1;2 = 0:7440 W1;2 = 0:5766
W3 = 0:8606 W3 = 0:6320 W3 = 0:5291
6)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 0:9531 W1;2 = 0:7148 W1;2 = 0:5694
W3 = 0:8926 W3 = 0:6639 W3 = 0:5449
7)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 1:0242 W1;2 = 0:7440 W1;2 = 0:5766
W3 = 0:8606 W3 = 0:6320 W3 = 0:5291
8)
fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg W1;2 = 1:0356 W1;2 = 0:7542 W1;2 = 0:5867
W3 = 0:8793 W3 = 0:6401 W3 = 0:5278
9)
fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg Wk = 1:0683 Wk = 0:7485 Wk = 0:5760
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PROOF: from Tables 2 and 3, we can see that countries’ preferences over alternative
trade arrangements vary with n and µ. For example, in Table 2 countries 1 and 2
obtain higher welfare gains in structure 8 than in structure 1, if µ = 1=2 and µ = 8=10
but not if µ = 2=10.28 This implies that multilateral cooperation is more attractive
when the traded goods are more dissimilar. Also notice that in Table 2 countries 1
and 2 never gain by moving from structure 1 to structure 7; in Table 3, however, this
move is pro…table for the case in which µ = 8=10. Therefore multilateral cooperation
is more attractive when the industry is more concentrated. Q.E.D.
4 The Outcome of the Trade Negotiations
Having examined the welfare implications of alternative trade arrangements, we can
now turn to the analysis of the …rst stage of the game, i.e. countries’ agreement choices.
As a solution, we use the concept of Stable Agreement Structure developed in Conconi
and Perroni (2000). Here we just recall the two key de…nitions:
De…nition 1 A Stable Agreement Structure is a structure which cannot be blocked.
De…nition 2 A coalition of one or more players constitutes a blocking objection to a
proposed agreement structure if and only if: (i) it is pro…table, i.e. at least one member
of the blocking coalition gains from the deviation and no member loses; and (ii) it is
immune from further deviations.
The stability de…nition is recursive: to be stable, a structure must not be blocked;
and to block, an objection must involve an arrangement that is itself stable. This con-
sistency requirement rules out coalitional deviations which are not themselves immune
from further deviations.
Applying De…nitions 1 and 2 to the case of homogeneous goods, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 1 In the case of homogeneous goods, ‘impure’ CUs are the only stable
negotiation outcome.
28It is easy to verify that, when n = 1, W 1;4;9k > W
8
1;2 if and only if µ < 0:1305.
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PROOF: from Lemma 1, we know that structure 7 is welfare improving for countries 1
and 2, relative to all other agreement structures except structure 8. However, the latter
is not stable, since country 3 will always object to it by leaving the tari¤ agreement.
Structure 7, on the other hand, cannot be blocked by country 3. It follows that the
‘impure’ CU structure is the only stable negotiation outcome.29
Therefore ‘impure’ CUs are stumbling blocs against the attainment of multilateral
trade cooperation. Since world welfare is always lower in the case of an ‘impure’ CU
than in the JGA, Proposition 1 supports the concern that the world as a whole will be
hurt more than helped by the formation of regional trading blocs.
Moving to the cases of heterogeneous products, we …nd:
Proposition 2 When the goods are nationally di¤erentiated, international trade ne-
gotiations will result in the formation of the JGA or of an ‘impure’ CU, depending on
the degree of industry concentration and on the extent of product di¤erentiation.
PROOF: from Table 2, we can see that the welfare gains achieved in structure 1 (and
in the equivalent structures 4 and 9) are larger than the gains obtained in any other
agreement structure. This suggests that, when goods are di¤erentiated and the industry
is extremely concentrated (only 3 national …rms are competing in each market), the
JGA will be the only stable outcome. In this case, the members of an ‘impure’ CU gain
more (in terms of product variety and increased domestic competition) by including
the third country than they gain (in terms of pro…t-shifting) by excluding it. Table 3
shows that, if the industry is more competitive (24 …rms are competing in each market)
and traded goods are characterized by a low degree of product di¤erentiation (e.g.
µ = 8=10), countries 1 and 2 can gain by putting forward structure 7, which country 3
will not be able to block. Therefore, if the product variety and pro-competitive e¤ects
of trade luberalization are small, ‘impure’ CUs represent a threat to multilateral trade
cooperation. Q.E.D.
Notice that the rather pessimistic results obtained in our analysis are in contrast
with the more optimistic conclusions obtained by Yi (1996) who, assuming that import
tari¤s are the only available policy instrument, …nds that free trade is the only stable
outcome of the tari¤ negotiations between three ex-ante symmetric countries.30
29This implies that structure 5—which is equivalent to structure 7—is also a stable outcome.
30Yi (1996) employs a multi-country extension of Brander and Spencer (1984a)’s tari¤ game and
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5 An International Ban on Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are prohibited by GATT rules.31 However, governments are often
able to use indirect forms of export support. These include: more favourable credit
conditions (the di¤erence between these and the normal conditions applied to producers
for the home market is paid by the government); insurance of certain risks (for example,
that the foreign imported defaults) paid by the government; and promotional activities
(such as trade fairs, advertising, etc.) organized by public agencies. For this reason,
the WTO has recently attempted to strengthen the rules against the use of export
subsidies (see Laird, 1999).32
In this section, we examine how the introduction of an e¤ective ban on export
subsidies would a¤ect the outcome of the trade negotiations between three ex-ante
symmetric countries. When import tari¤s are the only available policy instrument,
there are only …ve possible agreement structures, which, given the symmetry assump-
tion, can be restricted to the following three:
1. Global Free Trade:
fft1; t2; t3gg;
focuses on the case in which only one …rm is located in each country (n = 1). He computes the critical
number of countries such that free trade is a stable outcome under both the open regionalism and
unanimous regionalism rules. This is an increasing function of the degree of product di¤erentiation.
For example, for µ = 0:1, free trade is a stable outcome if there are less than 15 countries, while for
µ = 1, the critical value is 4.
31In the original GATT agreement in 1947 there was very little discipline on subsidies.
The …rst substantial obligations regarding the use of export subsides were introduced
in 1955 (see Article XVI, paragraphs 2-5). A Subsidies Code was adopted at the
Tokyo Round and revised at the Uruguay Round by the “Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures”. The latter distinguishes between prohibited, actionable and
nonactionable subsidies. See Jackson (1998) for a discussion of the evolution of the
rules on subsidies and countervailing duties.
32A panel adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in February 2000, requires, for
the …rst time, a company to repay in full an illegal member subsidy from a member government. This
case involves a dispute brought against Australia by the US over A$30 million in export subsidies to
a producer of automotive leather. Two other recent cases involve export subsidies worth billions of
$US: one rules against US tax exemptions for exporters; the other rules that Brazil has failed to lift
the export subsidies to its jet aircraft industries, as required in a previous panel.
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2. Nash Equilibrium:
fft1g; ft2g; ft3gg;
3. Partial tari¤ agreement (‘pure’ CU):
fft1; t2g; ft3gg.
Tables 4-6 report the welfare gains obtained in the tari¤-only agreement formation
game, for the same parameter combinations considered in Tables 1-3.33
Comparing the welfare gains obtained in the three alternative agreement structures,
we …nd:
Lemma 3 When governments are banned from using export subsidies, the welfare
ranking is always as follows: W 1k > W 31;2 > W 2k > W 33 .
PROOF: This result emerges from the analysis of Tables 4-6. Numerical simulations
show that Lemma 3 holds for any degree of product di¤erentiation and industry con-
centration, i.e. 8 0 · µ · 1, n ¸ 1. The reason behind this result is that the gains
associated with multilateral trade liberalization (i.e. the increase in domestic compe-
tition, product variety and export pro…ts) always outweigh the corresponding welfare
costs (i.e. the fall in domestic pro…ts and government revenues). Q.E.D.
The result in Lemma 3 can also be seen from Figures 1 and 2, where we plot
the welfare functions corresponding to the three agreement structures for the case of
homogeneous goods (µ = 1) and the case in which each country has only one …rm
(n = 1).
This result follows directly from Lemma 3:
Proposition 3 When governments are banned from using export subsidies, global free
trade is the only stable negotiation outcome.
PROOF: since global free trade (structure 1) yields larger welfare gains than any other
tari¤ arrangements, no country will ever want to deviate from it. Q.E.D.
Combining Propositions 1-3, we can thus conclude that, in the case of three ex-
ante symmetric countries, the introduction of an e¤ective ban on subsidies would make
multilateral trade cooperation sustainable when it would not be otherwise.
33The analytical expressions for optimal policies and equilibrium welfare functions for the tari¤-only
game can be obtained upon request.
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Table 4: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Homogeneous Goods)
(µ = 1)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
n = 1 n = 5 n = 8
1) fft1; t2; t3gg Wk = 0:4688 Wk = 0:4981 Wk = 0:4992
2) fft1g; ft2g; ft3gg Wk = 0:42 Wk = 0:4893 Wk = 0:4949
3) fft1; t2g; ft3gg W1;2 = 0:4574 W1;2 = 0:4967 W1;2 = 0:4986
W3 = 0:4055 W3 = 0:4880 W3 = 0:4944
Table 5: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods)
(n = 1)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
µ = 2=10 µ = 1=2 µ = 8=10
1) fft1; t2; t3gg Wk = 0:8854 Wk = 0:6667 Wk = 0:5324
2) fft1g; ft2g; ft3gg Wk = 0:7517 Wk = 0:58 Wk = 0:4710
3) fft1; t2g; ft3gg W1;2 = 0:8262 W1;2 = 0:6356 W1;2 = 0:5151
W3 = 0:7297 W3 = 0:5523 W3 = 0:4491
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Figure 1: Welfare Gains (Homogeneous Goods).
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Figure 2: Welfare Gains (n =1).
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Table 6: Agreement Structures and Countries’ Welfare (Heterogeneous Goods)
(n = 8)
Agreement Structure Countries’ Welfare
µ = 2=10 µ = 1=2 µ = 8=10
1) fft1; t2; t3gg Wk = 1:0642 Wk = 0:7474 Wk = 0:5757
2) fft1g; ft2g; ft3gg Wk = 1:0492 Wk = 0:7384 Wk = 0:5677
3) fft1; t2g; ft3gg W1;2 = 1:0581 W1;2 = 0:7449 W1;2 = 0:5743
W3 = 1:0435 W3 = 0:7315 W3 = 0:5611
Proposition (3) is in line with the results obtained by Yi (1996) for the case of three
ex-ante symmetric countries. Notice, however, that his optimistic conclusion about the
sustainability of free trade would be misleading if countries were able to use export
subsidies.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the formation of trade blocs when markets are imperfectly
competitive and governments can alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic
…rms through the use of import tari¤s and export subsidies.
Using a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante symmetric coun-
tries, we have obtained the following results:
² Three factors determine whether preferential trade agreements pose a threat to
the multilateral trading system: which policy instruments are at government
disposal, the degree of industry concentration, and the extent of product di¤er-
entiation;
² When both import tari¤s and export tari¤s are available, and the traded goods
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are homogeneous, ‘impure’ CUs—involving the coordinated use of both policy
instruments—are always stumbling blocs towards multilateral trade cooperation;
² When both policy instruments are available and …rms sell nationally di¤erenti-
ated products, multilateral cooperation is sustainable if the degrees of product
di¤erentiation and industry concentration are large enough;
² When countries are banned from using export subsidies, global free trade is the
only stable negotiation outcome.
These …ndings provide a rationale for the recent attempts to strengthen interna-
tional rules against the use of export subsidies.
A more general point emerges from our analysis: when governments can use dif-
ferent trade policy instruments, trade bloc formation should be described as a multi-
dimensional agreement formation game; focusing on one policy dimension only might
result in drawing incorrect conclusions about the negotiation outcomes.
We conclude by pointing out three directions of further research. First, it would
be important to employ a multi-country version of our model to examine how the
trade negotiation outcome are a¤ected by changes in the number of parties involved.
Second, it would be interesting to look at the case of heterogeneous countries; this would
require the analysis of intra-agreement bargaining problems, in order to understand how
agreement members divide total surplus. Finally, the strategic trade policy literature
has shown that governments can use a wide range of instruments (import tari¤s, export
subsidies, domestic subsidies, voluntary export restraints, R&D subsidies, competition
policy, etc.) to shift rents from foreign to domestic …rms. One could consider how the
availability of di¤erent policy instruments can alter the process of trade bloc formation.
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Appendix
In what follows, we report the optimal policies and the corresponding welfare functions
for the nine feasible agreement structures. We look at the case in which n …rms are
located in each country, selling homogeneous products (µ = 1).
1. fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2; s3gg:
t1ik = 0;
s1ik =
1
2n
;
W 1k =
1
2
: (12)
2. fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg:
t2ik =
1 + n
1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3
;
s2ik =
1 + 3n+ 3n2
1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3
;
W 2k =
n(6 + 49n+ 136n2 + 154n3 + 66n4 + 9n5)
2(1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3)
: (13)
3. fft1; t2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg:
t3ik = 0;
s3ik =
1 + n
2(3 + 5n)2
;
W 3k =
8 + 30n+ 25n2
2(3 + 5n)2
: (14)
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4. fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg:
t4ik =
1
2n
;
s4ik =
1
n
;
W 4k =
1
2
: (15)
5. fft1g; ft2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg:
t512 = t
5
21 =
1
2
;
t531 = t
5
32 = s
5
31 = s
5
31 = 0;
t513 = t
5
23 =
1 + 2n+ 3n2
1 + 7n+ 9n2 + 3n2
;
s512 = s
5
21 =
2
n
;
s513 = s
5
23 =
1 ¡ n
1 + 7n+ 9n2 + 3n2
;
W 51;2 =
1 + 13n+ 58n2 + 78n3 + 45n4 + 9n5
2(1 + n)(1 + 6n+ 3n2)2
; (16)
W 53 =
n(6 + 31n+ 69n2 + 45n3 + 9n4)
2(1 + n)(1 + 6n+ 3n2)2
: (17)
6. fft1g; ft2; t3g; fs1g; fs2g; fs3gg:
t612 = t
6
21 = 0;
t631 = t
6
32 =
1 + 4n+ 6n2
2 + 14n+ 29n2 + 18n3
;
t613 = t
6
23 =
1 + 3n+ 3n2
1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3
;
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s612 = s
6
21 =
1 + 4n+ 3n2
2n+ 10n2 + 9n3
;
s613 = s
6
23 =
1 + n
1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3
;
s631 = s
6
31 =
1 + n
2 + 14n+ 29n2 + 18n3
;
W 61;2 =
1
¾
n
3 + 82n+ 974n2 + 6568n3 + 27733n4 + 76516n5 + 139835n6
+167990n7 + 128832n8 + 59418n9 + 14661n10 + 1458n11
o
;
(18)
W 63 =
1
¾
n
n(24 + 472n+ 4024n2 + 19476n3 + 58930n4 + 115793n5
+148298n6 + 120462n7 + 58122n8 + 14661n9 + 1458n10
o
;
(19)
where ¾ = 2(1 + 2n)(2 + 10n+ 9n2)2(1 + 7n+ 11n2 + 3n3)2.
7. fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg:
t712 = t
7
21 =
1
2
;
t731 = t
7
32 = s
5
31 = s
5
31 = 0;
t713 = t
7
23 =
1 + 2n+ 3n2
1 + 7n+ 9n2 + 3n2
;
s712 = s
7
21 =
2
n
;
s713 = s
7
23 =
1 ¡ n
1 + 7n+ 9n2 + 3n2
;
W 71;2 =
1 + 13n+ 58n2 + 78n3 + 45n4 + 9n5
2(1 + n)(1 + 6n+ 3n2)2
; (20)
W 73 =
n(6 + 31n+ 69n2 + 45n3 + 9n4)
2(1 + n)(1 + 6n+ 3n2)2
: (21)
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8. fft1; t2; t3g; fs1; s2g; fs3gg:
t812 = t
8
21 = t
8
31 = t
8
32 = t
8
13 = t
8
23 = s
8
31 = s
8
31 = 0;
s812 = s
8
21 =
1
n
;
s813 = s
8
23 =
1 ¡ n
4n(1 + n)
;
W 81;2 =
5 + 4n
8(1 + n)
; (22)
W 83 =
1 + 6n+ 4n2
8(1 + n)2
: (23)
9. fft1; t2g; ft3g; fs1; s2; s3gg:
t912 = t
9
21 = 0;
t931 = t
9
32 = t
9
13 = t
9
23 = s
9
12 = s
9
21 =
1
2n
;
s913 = s
9
23 = s
9
31 = s
9
31 =
1
n
;
W 9k =
1
2
: (24)
Proof of Lemma 1
From the analysis of equations (12)-(24), it straightforward to verify that, 8 0 · µ · 1,
n ¸ 1,
W 81;2 ¡W 7;51;2 > 0,
W 7;51;2 ¡W 1;4;9k > 0,
W 1;4;9k ¡W 3k > 0,
W 3k ¡W 61;2 > 0,
W 61;2 ¡W 2k > 0,
W 2k ¡W 63 > 0,
W 63 ¡W 53 > 0,
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W 53 ¡W 73 > 0.
The welfare ranking of Lemma 1 emerges also from the analysis of Figures 3 and
4 in the next page, in which we plot the welfare gains obtained by the three countries
under alternative agreement structures.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 3: Welfare Gains for Countries 1 and 2
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Figure 4: Welfare Gains for Country 3
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